Delhi HC: Bipolar Disorder Alone Does Not Qualify as Medical Disability Without Benchmark Criteria  ||  Kerala HC: Excommunicating Knanaya Catholics For Marrying Outside the Community is Unconstitutional  ||  Kerala HC: Temporary Use of Religious Land For Public Infrastructure is Not a ‘Transfer’ under Law  ||  P&H HC: Habeas Plea in Child Custody Case Not Maintainable if Child is With Natural Guardian and Safe  ||  Delhi HC: Illegal Termination Does Not Automatically Entitle Employee to Reinstatement or Back Wages  ||  Gujarat High Court: Forcing Toddler to Attend Court 6 Hours Weekly For Grandfather Visits is Unjust  ||  Supreme Court Rejects Sameer Wankhede’s Plea, Directs Timely Resolution of Disciplinary Proceedings  ||  Supreme Court Rejects NHAI Review on Solatium Retrospectivity, Bars Reopening Settled Claims  ||  SC: Excise Duty Exemptions Based on Intended Use Must be Construed Liberally For Assessee  ||  Supreme Court: DSC Personnel Eligible For Second Pension; Allows Condonation of Shortfall    

R v. Golds - (30 Nov 2016)

There must be weighty reason for reduction of degree of offence from murder to lesser offence of manslaughter

Criminal

Appellant was convicted by a jury of murder of his partner. Appellant admitted in Court that he had killed deceased, and sole issue at his trial had been whether he had made out partial defence of diminished responsibility, and so fell to be convicted of manslaughter rather than of murder. Trial judge told the jury that he was not going to give them specific guidance on meaning of the everyday word “substantially”, unless it created difficulty and they requested assistance. Appellant appealed against his conviction. Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal. Mr Golds appealed to the Supreme Court.

Ordinarily, in a murder trial where diminished responsibility is an issue, judge is not ordinarily required to direct the jury beyond the terms of the statute, and should not attempt to define the meaning of “substantially”. However, if there is a risk that the jury will misunderstand the meaning of substantial, then a direction is required. Whether this risk arises is a matter for the judge. This may be the case where the jury has been introduced to the question of whether any impairment beyond the trivial will suffice, or has been introduced to the concept of a spectrum between greater than trivial and total. The judge must direct that while impairment must be more than merely trivial to be substantial, it is not the case that any impairment that is more than trivial will suffice.

There must be a weighty reason for a reduction from murder to the lesser offence of manslaughter, and not merely a reason which just passes the trivial. Expression “substantially impaired” has been consistently treated as a question of degree, and one that should be left to the jury. Where triviality was mentioned, as in R v Lloyd [1967] 1 QB 175, it was in the context of a direction to the jury that “substantial impairment” fell between two extremities: more than merely trivial, but less than total. There was no intention to direct that any impairment beyond trivial sufficed, or that the reference to the extremities of possible impairment should provide a definition of substantial impairment. Beyond the merely trivial, what amounted to a substantial impairment was a matter of degree for the jury. There is usually no need for jury to be directed on meaning of ordinary words: any attempt to find synonyms or re-define such words complicates the jury’s task and leads to further debate.

In instant case, renewal of attack despite the warning presence of children and removal of first knife might perhaps be some indicator of self-control and give some support to contention that, cause was simple anger rather than distorted thinking. If the appellant was indeed in the grip of a psychotic episode involving persecutory delusions when he killed his partner, that would, by any ordinary standard, involve substantial impairment of one or more of statutory abilities.

Tags : OFFENCE   DEGREE   REDUCTION  

Share :        

Disclaimer | Copyright 2026 - All Rights Reserved