Bombay HC: Wife Humiliating Husband in Front of His Friends is Amounts to Cruelty  ||  Delhi HC Interprets Doctrine of “Compelled Self-Publication”,  ||  Del. HC Issues Summons to Campus Sutra in Trademark Infringement Suit Filed by Footwear Brand Campus  ||  Bombay HC Dismisses PIL Seeking Restraining Order against PRADA  ||  Delhi HC: Cannot Bypass Bar on Revision of Interlocutory Order by Invoking Inherent Jurisdiction  ||  Delhi HC: Prosecutrix’s Refusal to Undergo Medical Examination Weakens the Case  ||  Bom. HC: No Provision under JJ Act that Allows Adoption of a Child of Foreign Citizenship  ||  SC Passes Order to Prevent Russian Mother’s Attempt to Flee with Child  ||  SC: Deprivation of Natural Heir from Will May Not Raise Suspicion  ||  SC: Denying Female Heir Right in Property Only Exacerbates Gender Division    

Shaifuddin (Dead) Thr. Lrs. Vs. Kanhaiya Lal (Dead) Thr. Lrs . - (Supreme Court) (24 Apr 2023)

Limitation period for execution of decree commences only when the decree becomes enforceable

MANU/SC/0437/2023

Limitation

By way of present appeal, the judgment passed by the High Court is assailed on the ground that the execution application was filed after 12 years from the date of the decree, and the same was therefore, barred by time. The question which arises in present Appeal is whether the date on which the compromise decree dated 26th April, 1960 was entered into or the date when the final decree was passed by the Civil Court in Suit, will be considered for establishing the period of limitation under the Limitation Act, 1963 for instituting execution proceedings?

A perusal of the clause of the compromise decree clearly shows that, during the pendency of the suit, the Appellant surrendered the land to the State Government. Notably, this compromise decree was entered into wherein it was specified that if due to such surrender, the Respondents (Decree holders) were to lose possession of the land, then the Appellant (Judgement Debtor) would give 1 bigha and 5 biswas to the former.

The facts of the instant appeal reveal that the cause of action to execute the compromise decree arose, when the premises were taken away from the possession of the Decree holders (Respondents Nos.1 to 4). The dispossession of the Respondents was confirmed vide final decree passed by the Civil Court in Suit when rights in favor of third person, namely, were finally determined. Hence, the cause of action would arise only on 31st March, 1994. The prerequisite for enforceability of clause 6 is the dispossession of the Defendants, de facto or de jure.

Clause 6 of the compromise decree could not have been executed unless the Decree Holders were to lose their right of possession, which fact was not a possibility unless such rights stood conclusively determined by the Civil Court.

The limitation period would commence only with the decree becoming enforceable and thus is capable of being executed. In the instant case, the relevant date from which the period of limitation will begin only with effect from 31st March, 1994. The period of twelve years is computable from the said date, hence the Execution Application made on 17th July, 1995 is within Limitation. During the pendency of this appeal, the opportunity for compromise was given to the parties. But, no compromise could be arrived at. Courts below rightly held that, the Execution Application is within Limitation. Appeal dismissed.

Tags : LIMITATION PERIOD   COMMENCEMENT   DECREE  

Share :        

Disclaimer | Copyright 2025 - All Rights Reserved