Rajendra Diwan Vs. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala and Ors. - (Supreme Court) (10 Dec 2019)

State legislature cannot enact law providing direct appeal to Apex Court

MANU/SC/1716/2019

Tenancy

Present appeal, purportedly under Section 13(2) of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011, is against an order of the Rent Control Tribunal, confirming an order passed by the Rent Control Authority, whereby an application filed by the Respondent-landlord for eviction of the Appellant tenant under Section 12 of the Rent Control Act has been allowed.

The question which requires to be determined by this Bench is, whether Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act is ultra vires the Constitution of India, by reason of lack of legislative competence of the Chhattisgarh State legislature to enact the provision.

The Supreme Court has been established under Article 124 of the Constitution of India, 1950 and derives its jurisdiction and powers from Articles 131 to 145 thereof. There is no provision in the Constitution which provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court, from an order of a Tribunal constituted under any law enacted by a State Legislature.

On a conjoint reading of Article 323B and Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India with Entry 18 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule, there can be no doubt that, the State Legislature was competent to enact law to provide for adjudication and trial of all disputes, complaints and offences relating to tenancy and rent, by a Tribunal. The Chhattisgarh State Legislature was thus competent to enact the Rent Control Act, to the extent that it provides for the adjudication of original disputes relating to tenancy and rent by the Rent Controller, and creates a Tribunal to decide appeals from orders of the Rent Controller, but subject to the exception.

Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, providing for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from orders passed by the Rent Control Tribunal, is not ancillary or incidental to the power of the Chhattisgarh State Legislature to enact a Rent Control Act, which provides for appellate adjudication of appeals relating to tenancy and rent by a Tribunal. In enacting Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, the Chhattisgarh State Legislature has overtly transgressed the limits of its legislative power, as reiterated and discussed hereinafter.

Both the Union legislature and the State Legislature derive their power to legislate from Article 245 of the Constitution of India. It is axiomatic that the legislature of a State may only make laws for the whole or any part of the State, while Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India. There is no provision in the Constitution which saves State laws with extra-territorial operation, similar to Article 245(2) which expressly saves Union laws with extra-territorial operation, enacted by Parliament. The Chhattisgarh State Legislature, thus, patently lacks competence to enact any law which affects the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, outside the State of Chhattisgarh.

Entry 18 of the State List, which only enables the State Legislature to legislate with regard to land, land tenures, landlord tenant relationship, collection of rents etc. does not enable the State Legislature to enact law conferring appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in respect of orders passed by an Appellate Rent Control Tribunal, constituted under a state law.

In view of Entry 77 of the Union List, only Parliament has the legislative competence to legislate with respect to the constitution, organization, jurisdiction or powers of the Supreme Court. Entry 64 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List enable the State Legislature to enact law with respect to the jurisdiction and powers of Courts except the Supreme Court. In other words, the said Entries expressly debar the State Legislature from legislating with respect to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court does not act as a regular court of appeal. The power of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution is not to be confused with the appellate power ordinarily exercised by appellate courts and Tribunals under specific statutes. Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal on any party, but confers a discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in appropriate cases. This power can be exercised in spite of other provisions for appeal contained in the Constitution, or any other law, as held in N. Natarajan v. B.K. Subba Rao.

Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court entertains appeals by special leave, where substantial questions of law or questions of public importance are involved. Where there is any uncertainty in the law, the Supreme Court, in its discretion, settles the law. The Supreme Court does not ordinarily interfere with concurrent findings of fact Under Article 136. If the concurrent findings are based on accepted oral or documentary evidence, there is no interference Under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Presidential assent makes no difference in case of legislative incompetence. Presidential assent cannot and does not validate an enactment in excess of the legislative powers of the State Legislature, nor validate a statutory provision, which would render express provisions of the Constitution otiose. Presidential assent cures repugnancy with an earlier Central Statute, provided the State Legislature is otherwise competent to enact the Statute. The State Legislature lacked legislative competence to enact Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act. Present Court, therefore, declare Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act ultra vires the Constitution of India, null and void and of no effect.

Relevant : N. Natarajan v. B.K. Subba Rao, MANU/SC/1083/2002

Tags : LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE PROVISION ENACTMENT