Ramendra Jain JUDGMENT
Ajay Kumar Mittal, J.
1. The present application has been filed by the applicant-appellant under Section 389 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, "the Cr.P.C.) seeking suspension of conviction qua her during the pendency of the main appeal.
2. A few facts relevant for the decision of the controversy involved as narrated in the application may be noticed. FIR dated 3.10.2010 was registered against the applicant alongwith others under Sections 302, 304, 313, 201, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (in short, "IPC"). After investigation and trial by the Sessions Court, the applicant was convicted under Section 120-B read with Sections 313, 365 and 344 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years and to pay a fine of ` 5000/- and in default of payment to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months. Against the said judgment, the applicant filed Criminal Appeal-S. No. 1500-SB of 2012 in this Court which was admitted for regular hearing vide order dated 7.5.2012 Thereafter, the applicant prayed for suspension of sentence by way of Criminal Miscellaneous No. 39013 of 2012 during the pendency of the appeal. The said application was disposed of vide order dated 1.11.2012 as the applicant was directed to be released on bail on her furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patiala. It was further observed that the applicant cannot leave the country without the prior permission of this Court. Thereafter, the applicant approached this Court through CRM No. 20540 of 2015 for permission to visit abroad for a period of three weeks which was allowed vide order dated 13.7.2015, Annexure A.2. The applicant asserts that she is a sitting MLA representing Bholath constituency in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. She is also a senior Vice President of the Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal) and President of the Woman Wing of the party. The applicant has served as Cabinet Minister in the State of Punjab on more than one occasion. She was the first and only woman President of the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee and has discharged various responsibilities conferred on her in public life with distinction. According to the applicant, she has falsely been implicated in the present case. Since the sentence imposed upon her is only for a limited duration, the same does not qualify as moral turpitude. The applicant has been constrained to approach this court on account of impending election in the State of Punjab in the year 2017 wherein the applicant being a senior leader of the party is likely to campaign across length and breadth of the State and is likely to seek another opportunity to serve the constituency of Bholath which she has served earlier on three occasions. On account of conviction of the applicant, she is not competent to contest the election due to bar contained in Section 8 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 (in short, "the 1951 Act"). Hence the instant application for suspension of conviction by the applicant. The CBI and the complainant-Kamaljeet Singh have filed Crl.A.-D-867-DB-2012 and Crl.A.-D-868-DB-2012 against acquittal of the accused under Section 120-B read with Sections 302/201 IPC and substantive offences under Sections 302, 302/34 and 201 IPC.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
4. Firstly, legal position may be examined. Sub-section (1) of Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. relates to the powers of the appellate court regarding suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed against during the pendency of the appeal. It would be expedient to reproduce Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C., which reads thus:-
"389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail. (1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond."
The three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang and others, MANU/SC/0623/1995 : (1995) 2 SCC 513, had elaborately discussed the scope and ambit of the powers of the appellate court envisaged thereunder. The concept of suspension of conviction under the aforesaid provision was recognized. The relevant observations are as under:-
"In certain situations the order of conviction can be executable, in the sense it may incur a disqualification as in the instant case. In such a case the power under Section 389(1) of the Code could be invoked. In such situations the attention of the appellate court must be specifically invited to the consequences which are likely to fall to enable it to apply its mind to the issue since under Section 389(1) it is under an obligation to support its order for reasons to be recorded by it in writing. If the attention of the Court is not invited to this specific consequence which is likely to fall upon conviction how can it be expected to assign reasons relevant thereto? No one can be allowed to play hide and seek with the Court; he cannot suppress the precise purpose for which he seeks suspension of the conviction and obtain a general order of stay and then contend that the disqualification has ceased to operate."
5. Following the decision of Rama Narang's case (supra), the Supreme Court in K.C. Sareen v. C.B.I, Chandigarh, MANU/SC/0409/2001 : AIR 2001 SC 3320 had concluded as under:-
"11. The legal position, therefore, is this: Though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code; its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely because the convictioned person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The court has a duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. It is in the light of the above legal position that we have to examine the question as to what should be the position when a public servant is convicted of an offence under the PC Act. No doubt when the appellate court admits the appeal filed in challenge of the conviction and sentence for the offence under the PC Act, the superior court should normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after the filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the offence under the PC Act, de hors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel thereto, is a different matter."
The aforesaid view was reiterated in Navjot Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab and another, MANU/SC/0648/2007 : (2007) 2 SCC 574.
6. The Parliament by incorporating sub-section (4) to Section 8 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 (for brevity, "1951 Act") in the year 1989 by Act No. 1 of 1989 w.e.f. 15.3.1989, had provided privilege to the sitting Member of Parliament or the Legislature of a State protecting them from disqualification and enabling them to continue as members even after their conviction was recorded of the offences mentioned in sub sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8of the 1951 Act. It reads thus:-
"8. Disqualification on conviction for certain offences. (1) to (3) xxxx
(4) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) a disqualification under either subsection shall not, in the case of a person who on the date of the conviction is a member of Parliament or the Legislature of a State, take effect until three months have elapsed from that date or, if within that period an appeal or application for revision is brought in respect of the conviction or the sentence, until that appeal or application is disposed of by the court."
7. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India and others, MANU/SC/0687/2013 : (2013) 7 SCC 653, the Supreme Court held Section 8(4) of the 1951 Act to be unconstitutional with the following conclusion:-
"21. We do not also find merit in the submission of Mr. Luthra and Mr. Kuhad that if a sitting member of Parliament or the State Legislature suffers from a frivolous conviction by the trial court for an offence given under sub-section (1), (2) or (3) of Section 8 of the Act, he will be remediless and he will suffer immense hardship as he would stand disqualified on account of such conviction in the absence of subsection (4) of Section 8 of the Act. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang & Ors. [MANU/SC/0623/1995 : (1995) 2 SCC 513] has held that when an appeal is preferred under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [for short 'the Code'] the appeal is against both the conviction and sentence and, therefore, the Appellate Court in exercise of its power under Section 389(1) of the Code can also stay the order of conviction and the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code can also stay the conviction if the power was not to be found in Section 389(1) of the Code. In Ravikant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali [MANU/SC/8600/2006 : (2007) 1 SCC 673], a three-Judge Bench of this Court, however, observed:
"It deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where the conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. An order of stay, of course, does not render the conviction non-existent, but only non-operative. Be that as it may. Insofar as the present case is concerned, an application was filed specifically seeking stay of the order of conviction specifying the consequences if conviction was not stayed, that is, the appellant would incur disqualification to contest the election. The High Court after considering the special reason, granted the order staying the conviction. As the conviction itself is stayed in contrast to a stay of execution of the sentence, it is not possible to accept the contention of the respondent that the disqualification arising out of conviction continues to operate even after stay of conviction."
In the aforesaid case, a contention was raised by the respondents that the appellant was disqualified from contesting the election to the Legislative Assembly under sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act as he had been convicted for an offence punishable under Sections 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code and it was held by the three-Judge Bench that as the High Court for special reasons had passed an order staying the conviction, the disqualification arising out of the conviction ceased to operate after the stay of conviction. Therefore, the disqualification under subsection (1), (2) or (3) of Section 8 of the Act will not operate from the date of order of stay of conviction passed by the Appellate Court under Section 389 of the Code or the High Court under Section 482 of the Code.
22. As we have held that Parliament had no power to enact sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act and accordingly sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution, it is not necessary for us to go into the other issue raised in these writ petitions that sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It would have been necessary for us to go into this question only if sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act was held to be within the powers of the Parliament. In other words, as we can declare sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act as ultra vires the Constitution without going into the question as to whether sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, we do not think it is necessary to decide the question as to whether sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
23. The only question that remains to be decided is whether our declaration in this judgment that subsection (4) of Section 8 of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution should affect disqualifications already incurred under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act by sitting members of Parliament and State Legislatures who have filed appeals or revisions against their conviction within a period of three months and their appeals and revisions are still pending before the concerned court. Under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act, the disqualification takes effect from the date of conviction for any of the offences mentioned in the sub-sections and remains in force for the periods mentioned in the sub-sections. Thus, there may be several sitting members of Parliament and State Legislatures who have already incurred disqualification by virtue of a conviction covered under sub-section (1), or sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act. In Golak Nath and Others v. State of Punjab and Another (MANU/SC/0029/1967 : AIR 1967 SC 1643), Subba Rao, C.J. speaking on behalf of himself, Shah, Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ. has held that Articles 32, 141, 142 of the Constitution are couched in such a wide and elastic terms as to enable this Court to formulate legal doctrines to meet the ends of justice and has further held that this Court has the power not only to declare the law but also to restrict the operation of the law as declared to future and save the transactions, whether statutory or otherwise, that were effected on the basis of the earlier law. Sitting members of Parliament and State Legislature who have already been convicted for any of the offences mentioned in sub-section (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act and who have filed appeals or revisions which are pending and are accordingly saved from the disqualifications by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act should not, in our considered opinion, be affected by the declaration now made by us in this judgment. This is because the knowledge that sitting members of Parliament or State Legislatures will no longer be protected by sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act will be acquired by all concerned only on the date this judgment is pronounced by this Court. As has been observed by this Court in Harla v. State of Rajasthan (MANU/SC/0014/1951 : AIR 1951 SC 467):
"...it would be against the principles of natural justice to permit the subjects of a State to be punished or penalized by laws of which they had no knowledge and of which they could not even with exercise of due diligence have acquired any knowledge." However, if any sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature is convicted of any of the offences mentioned in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act and by virtue of such conviction and/or sentence suffers the disqualifications mentioned in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act after the pronouncement of this judgment, his membership of Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be, will not be saved by sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act which we have by this judgment declared as ultra vires the Constitution notwithstanding that he files the appeal or revision against the conviction and/or sentence."
The pronouncement was held to be prospective affecting the future cases relating to MPs and MLAs whereas those who had already filed the appeal within the period of limitation were not governed by it. This has necessitated the applicant-appellant to prefer the present application under Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C. seeking suspension of conviction.
8. Examining the principles governing the suspension of conviction, the Supreme Court had on several occasions considered the said question in various cases and had laid down guiding principles. In K.C. Sareen's case (supra), the Apex Court opined that exercise of power to suspend order of conviction should be limited to very exceptional cases. Further, merely filing of an appeal by the convicted person should not be a ground to suspend the conviction. The court is duty bound to take into consideration all aspects and ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance.
9. In Navjot Singh Sidhu's case (supra), it was held that grant of stay of conviction can be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the special facts of the case. The relevant observations read thus:-
"3. ...The legal position is, therefore, clear that an appellate Court can suspend or grant stay of order of conviction. But the person seeking stay of conviction should specifically draw the attention of the appellate Court to the consequences that may arise if the conviction is not stayed. Unless the attention of the Court is drawn to the specific consequences that would follow on account of the conviction, the person convicted cannot obtain an order of stay of conviction. Further, grant of stay of conviction can be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the special facts of the case."
10. In Ravikant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali, MANU/SC/8600/2006 : (2007) 1 SCC 673, the Apex Court laid down that power to stay conviction should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances where failure to stay the conviction would lead to injustice and irreversible consequences. It was concluded as under:-
"17. All these decisions, while recognizing the power to stay conviction, have cautioned and clarified that such power should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances where failure to stay the conviction, would lead to injustice and irreversible consequences."
11. The Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar, MANU/SC/0861/2012 : (2012) 12 SCC 384, in view of the authoritative pronouncements noticed hereinbefore, had again summarized the legal position in the following terms:-
"12. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, a clear picture emerges to the effect that, the Appellate Court in an exceptional case, may put the conviction in abeyance alongwith the sentence, but such power must be exercised with great circumspection and caution, for the purpose of which, the applicant must satisfy the court as regards the evil that is likely to befall him, if the said conviction is not suspended. The court has to consider all the facts as are pleaded by the applicant, in a judicious manner and examine whether the facts and circumstances involved in the case are such, that they warrant such a course of action by it. The court additionally, must record in writing, its reasons for granting such relief. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if the same is not done."
12. From the aforesaid decisions, the following conclusions would emerge:-
"i) That the appellate court in exercise of its power under Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C. has the power to grant suspension of conviction;
ii) Power to grant stay of conviction should be exercised with great circumspection and caution and in the rarest of the rare cases and the court has to consider the totality of facts and circumstances in a judicious manner and then come to the conclusion whether it is a fit case warranting stay of conviction;
iii) The person seeking stay of conviction should specifically draw the attention of the court to the consequences that may arise if the conviction is not stayed.
iv) Power to stay conviction should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances where failure to stay the conviction would lead to injustice and irreversible consequences and the court should record reasons in writing for granting such relief."
13. There is no straight-jacket formula on the basis of which it can be held that stay of suspension of conviction is to be made. While doing so, totality of facts have to be taken into consideration and thereafter the issue is to be adjudicated. In other words, each case has to be decided on its on facts.
14. Having crystallized the legal position, we proceed to examine the factual matrix in the present case. Admittedly, in the present case, the applicant Bibi Jagir Kaur has been held guilty for the offence under section 120-B read with Sections 313, 365 and 344 IPC vide judgment dated 30.3.2012 rendered by the Sessions Court after examining the rival submissions of both the parties. Now the prayer is for stay of order of conviction as she intends to contest the coming elections in the State of Punjab. Causing miscarriage has been dealt under Section 312 of the IPC whereas for causing miscarriage without woman's consent, the punishment has been prescribed in Section 313 IPC. Sections 312 and 313 IPC read thus:-
"312. Causing miscarriage.--Whoever voluntarily causes a woman with child to miscarry, shall, if such miscarriage be not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and, if the woman be quick with child, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.--A woman who causes herself to miscarry, is within the meaning of this section."
"313. Causing miscarriage without woman's consent.-- Whoever commits the offence defined in the last preceding section without the consent of the woman, whether the woman is quick with child or not, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
A plain reading of the above provisions shows that Section 312 IPC provides punishment for voluntarily causing miscarriage to a woman which may extend to three years rigorous imprisonment or fine or both. Section 313 IPC provides punishment for causing miscarriage to a women without her consent which may extend to imprisonment for life or sentence of ten years and fine. Offence under section 313 IPC is very serious offence. Against the impugned judgment, cross appeals i.e. Crl.A.-D-867-DB-2012 and Crl.A.-D-868-DB-2012 have also been filed for enhancement of punishment. Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant had vociferously argued for acquittal whereas learned counsel for the CBI and complainant had vehemently contended that it is a case where applicant-appellant be convicted under section 120-B read with Section 302/201 IPC and substantive offences under Sections 302, 302/34 and 201 IPC as the trial court had erred in acquitting her under the said charges. As the appeal is pending consideration, we do not consider appropriate to delve into the merits of the controversy at this stage as it might prejudice either party by our observations in that behalf.
15. A person holding public office like the applicant is entrusted with powers to be exercised in public interest and the office is held by the said person in trust for the people. Involvement in such a serious offence of a person holding public office amounts to breach of trust. Selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership are the settled principles of public life. Holders of public office should promote and support these principles by leadership and example. It is well settled that holders of public offices are entrusted with certain powers to be exercised in public interest alone and therefore, the office is held by them in trust for the people. Any deviation from the path of rectitude by any of them amounts to a breach of trust and must be severely dealt with instead of being pushed under the carpet. The principles of public life are of general application in every democracy and one is expected to bear them in mind while scrutinizing the conduct of every holder of a public office. In Vineet Narain v. Union of India, MANU/SC/0827/1998 : 1998(1) SCC 226, the Supreme Court while discussing the principles of public life recorded thus:-
"57. It is a similar perception in England which has led to the constitution of a Committee headed by Lord Nolan on 'Standards in Public Life'. In Volume 1 of Lord Nolan's Report (1995), the general recommendations made are:
General recommendation
4. Some of our conclusions have general application across the entire service;
Principles of public life
5. The general principles of conduct which underpin public life need to be restated. We have done this. The seven principles of selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership are set out in full on page 14.
Codes of Conduct
6. All public bodies should draw up Codes of Conduct incorporating these principles Independent Scrutiny
7. Internal systems for maintaining standards should be supported by independent scrutiny.
Education
8. More needs to be done to promote and reinforce standards of conduct in public bodies, in particular through guidance and training, including induction training".
58. The Seven Principles of Public Life are stated in the Report by Lord Nolan, thus:
"The Seven Principles of Public Life Selflessness Holders of public office should take decisions solely in terms of the public interest. They should not do so in order to gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, their family, or their friends.
Integrity: Holders of public office should not place themselves under any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or organisations that might influence them in the performance of their official duties.
Objectivity: In carrying out public business, including making public appointments, awarding contracts, or recommending individuals for rewards and benefits, holders of public office should make choices on merit Accountability Holders of public office are accountable for their decisions and actions to the public and must submit themselves to whatever scrutiny is appropriate to their office Openness Holders of public office should be as open as possible about all the decisions and actions that they take. They should give reasons for their decisions and restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly demands.
Honesty: Holders of public office have a duty to declare any private interests relating to their public duties and to take steps to resolve any conflicts arising in a way that protects the public interest.
Leadership: Holders of public office should promote and support these principles by leadership and example."
59. These principles of public life are of general application in every democracy and one is expected to bear them in mind while scrutinising the conduct of every holder of a public office. It is trite that the holders of public offices are entrusted with certain powers to be exercised in public interest alone and, therefore, the office is held by them in trust for the people. Any deviation from the path of rectitude by any of them amounts to a breach of trust and must be severely dealt with instead of being pushed under the carpet. If the conduct amounts to an offence, it must be promptly investigated and the offender against whom a prima facie case is made out should be prosecuted expeditiously so that the majesty of law is upheld and the rule of law vindicated. It is duty of the judiciary to enforce the rule of law and, therefore, to guard against erosion of the rule of law."
16. Further, in Shyam Narain Pandey v. State of UP, 2015 Criminal Law Journal 250, it was held by the Supreme Court that if conviction in offences involving moral turpitude and crime which are outrageous is stayed, it would have serious impact on the public perception on the integrity of the institution. Such orders definitely will shake the public confidence in judiciary. It was further observed that conviction could be stayed only in very rare and exceptional cases of irreparable injury coupled with irreversible consequences. The relevant observations read thus:-
"7.'Convict' means declared to be guilty of criminal offence by the verdict of court of law. That declaration is made after the court finds him guilty of the charges which have been proved against him. Thus, in effect, if one prays for stay of conviction, he is asking for stay of operation of the effects of the declaration of being guilty.
8. It has been consistently held by this Court that unless there are exceptional circumstances, the appellate court shall not stay the conviction, though the sentence may be suspended. There is no hard and fast rule or guidelines as to what are those exceptional circumstances. However, there are certain indications in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 itself as to which are those situations and a few indications are available in the judgments of this Court as to what are those circumstances.
9. It may be noticed that even for the suspension of the sentence, the court has to record the reasons in writing under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. Couple of provisos were added under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. pursuant to the recommendations made by the Law Commission of India and observations of this Court in various judgments, as per Act 25 of 2005. It was regarding the release on bail of a convict where the sentence is of death or life imprisonment or of a period not less than ten years. If the appellate court is inclined to consider release of a convict of such offences, the public prosecutor has to be given an opportunity for showing cause in writing against such release. This is also an indication as to the seriousness of such offences and circumspection which the court should have while passing the order on stay of conviction. Similar is the case with offences involving moral turpitude. If the convict is involved in crimes which are so outrageous and yet beyond suspension of sentence, if the conviction also is stayed, it would have serious impact on the public perception on the integrity institution. Such orders definitely will shake the public confidence in judiciary. That is why, it has been cautioned time and again that the court should be very wary in staying the conviction especially in the types of cases referred to above and it shall be done only in very rare and exceptional cases of irreparable injury coupled with irreversible consequences resulting in injustice."
17. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances as noticed above, in our opinion, no irreparable loss and injury would be caused to the applicant-appellant. Rather, if a public figure becomes entitled to hold public office and to continue to do official acts until he or she is judicially absolved from findings against him/her by reason of suspension of conviction, it would adversely affect public interest and even irreparably. Consequently, it is not considered to be a fit case for suspending the conviction of the applicant-appellant.
18. In all fairness to learned counsel for the applicant-appellant, we deal with the pronouncement on the basis of which similarity was claimed. Great emphasis was laid down on Navjot Singh Sidhu's (supra), wherein the appellant alongwith co-accused was tried for charges under Section 302 IPC and Section 323 read with Section 34 IPC. He was acquitted by the Sessions Court which order was challenged by the State of Punjab by filing an appeal in the High Court which had been allowed and the appellant was convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC and had been sentenced to three years RI and fine of rupees one lac. The appellant filed Special Leave Petition in the Apex Court and he had been released on bail. He also prayed for stay of order of conviction. The appellant was a sitting member of Parliament. Immediately after the pronouncement of judgment by the High court, he resigned from the membership of the Lok Sabha to maintain probity and moral values in public life. He wanted to remain in public life and to contest the election again and face the electorate in the changed scenario. It was noticed that the incident took place on 27.12.1988 whereas he entered public life much later in 2004 when he was elected as a Member of Parliament. He had not taken any advantage of his position as M.P. in the commission of the crime. It was also observed that though he was not required to resign but he had adopted a moral path and had set high standards in public life by resigning from his seat and was seeking fresh mandate from the public. Thus, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Apex Court suspended the order of conviction. The position in the present case being distinguishable, no benefit is available to the applicant-appellant from the said decision.
19. Equally with full vehemence, learned counsel for the applicant-appellant sought to claim parity on the basis of the order of the Apex Court in Sucha Singh Langah v. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal No. 40 of 2017 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5 of 2017, decided on 05.01.2017. A perusal of the said order shows that the Apex Court on the basis of the grounds of appeal taken therein had allowed the appeal. A copy of the Special Leave Petition filed therein had been produced by the learned counsel for the applicant-appellant. It would be apt to refer to the grounds of appeal taken therein. The order of the High Court declining suspension of conviction was inter alia assailed on the following grounds:-
"i) because of his political affiliation with Akali Dal, the petitioner Sucha Singh Langah alongwith several other Akali ministers was falsely implicated in criminal cases by the Congress government in the year 2002 with the change of political regime in Punjab. All the 15 cases registered against Akali Ministers and some IAS officers had resulted into acquittal by the Court of law. Further, the Court passed strictures against the present Investigating officer Shri Surinder Pal Singh, SSP who had registered these cases also.
ii) the court wrongly relied upon judgment in State of Maharashtra v. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar, MANU/SC/0861/2012 : (2012) 12 SCC 384 wherein the petitioner was an employee in a government organization and the Supreme Court refused to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that it was certainly not the case where damage if done cannot be undone as the respondent employee if ultimately succeeds, could claim all consequential benefits.
iii) the court failed to appreciate that in Rama Narang's case (supra) it had been held that the High Court may suspend or stay the conviction pending the appeal so that the convicted person does not have to suffer from a disqualification provided by some other statute as the damage cannot be undone.
iv) the court failed to exercise jurisdiction under section 389 of the Cr.P.C. empowering it to stay the order of conviction if it is satisfied that the petitioner suffers irreversible and irrevocable loss and the damage done cannot be undone in case the order of conviction is not kept in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal.
v) the petitioner was a victim of political vendetta and falsely implicated in a vexatious prosecution. The High Court failed to appreciate the compelling and exceptional circumstances of the petitioner who would suffer irreversible damage, in case the conviction is not stayed pending the adjudication of the appeal.
vi) the appeal has been pending for considerably long time in the High Court."
The legal as well as factual position in the present case being different as noticed hereinbefore, no advantage can be derived by the applicant-appellant from the said decision.
20. The upshot of the above discussion leads to an irresistible conclusion that there is no merit in the application filed under Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C. for suspension of conviction and accordingly, the same is declined.
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