Chander Bhusan Barowalia JUDGMENT
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J.
1. Since common question of law and fact arise for consideration in both petitions, therefore, they were taken up together for consideration and are being disposed of by way of a common judgment.
2. The petitioner in Cr.MMO No. 310 of 2017 is a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, whereas the petitioner in Cr.MMO No. 164 of 2018 is an employee of M/s. Carzonrent (India) Pvt. Ltd. (for short the "Company") (petitioner in Cr.MMO No. 310 of 2017).
3. Both the petitioners are aggrieved by the registration of FIR against them in Police Station Kangra, H.P. vide FIR No. 209/2017, dated 12.07.2017, under Sections 406, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and have filed the present petitions for quashing of the aforesaid FIR.
4. Brief facts of the case as set out in the petition are that the petitioner-company is engaged in car-rental business and was approached by respondent No. 2 M/s. Auto World Marketing in February, 2017 through its proprietor Mr. Dinesh Pathania, whereby he expressed his desire for purchasing used cars on 'as is where is' basis. The entire list of the cars which respondent No. 2 wanted to purchase was supplied to him and eventually a written contract was executed between the parties on 15.02.2017 at Delhi. As per the contractual understanding respondent No. 2 had agreed to purchase 143 vehicles from Company, in batches of three, for a total consideration of Rs. 6,30,00,000/- (Rupees six crores and thirty lacs only) and it was further agreed that the payment shall be made by respondent No. 2 to the petitioner-Company in the following manners:-
5. In addition thereto, it was also agreed that the above payments had to be made by respondent No. 2 a day prior to the delivery of the batch of cars, as contemplated in Clause 8 of the Contract, wherein it was further provided that in the event of respondent No. 2 failed to make payment one day prior to the delivery of the vehicles, then the petitioner-Company would provide 10 (ten) days further grace period for making the payment. However, if the payment was not made even within the grace period, then the petitioner-Company have right to levy interest, at the rate of 12% per annum on the unpaid amount till the said amount is finally paid by respondent No. 2. It was also agreed that in case the payments scheduled to be made is actually made in part, then petitioner-Company shall only hand over the vehicles for which the payments have been received and shall not hand over rest of the vehicles to respondent No. 2.
6. By virtue of Contract, respondent No. 2 had also agreed to purchase 9 (nine) Mercedes Benz cars 'C' Class, for a total consideration of Rs. 77,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy Seven Lacs only). The payment in terms of this batch of cars was required to be made by respondent No. 2 latest by 24.02.2017. It was also agreed that payment in respect of this batch of cars, could not be delayed beyond 24.02.2017 and if there was any delay in making payment then the petitioner-Company would within its contractual rights to claim an additional amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lacs only) on account of penalty.
7. As per Clause 9 of the Contract, respondent No. 2 was under an obligation to transfer the vehicle registration in the books of the RTO either in its name or in the name of the end user within 60 (sixty) days from the date of handing over of the third batch of cars by the petitioner-Company. In case of violation of this contractual condition, it was agreed that petitioner-Company shall reserve its right to levy the penalty of Rs. 50,00,000/- (Rupees fifty lacs only) on respondent No. 2.
8. It was further averred that despite the clear provisions of the contract, respondent No. 2 tried his level best to evade his financial obligation towards the petitioner-Company on a false pretexts. Lame and baseless reasons were cited by him to avoid payments to the petitioner-Company. The petitioner-Company, through its officials starting from 16.03.2017, had been demanding the payments of the cars purchased by respondent No. 2 as per the agreement. Earlier respondent No. 2 had made the payment as per the agreement dated 15.02.2017 and thereafter also, respondent No. 2 issued two cheques in lieu of the payment pending for receiving the delivery of vehicles left. However, even after several reminders, respondent No. 2 failed to make payment within the stipulated time and date. The petitioner-Company official via mail dated 27.03.2017 allowed flexibility in payment of the amount due in a much more convenient mode and manner for respondent No. 2, even though such flexibility was not in line with the agreement. Vide mail dated 01.04.2017, respondent No. 2 had specifically admitted that he would not be able to act according to the terms and conditions and had sought further time to pay the unpaid amount to the petitioner. On 05.04.2017, respondent No. 2 came to the office of the petitioner-Company situated at New Delhi and met with Managing Director of the petitioner-Company, namely, Mr. Rajiv Vij, Mr. S. Kumar and Mr. Vishal Kumar and handed over the below mentioned cheques:-
A. Cheque bearing No. 518943, amounting to Rs. 80,00,000/-, dated 05.05.2017 of Branch Kangra, H.P.
B. Cheque bearing No. 518941, amounting to Rs. 3,00,00,000/-, dated 03.04.2017 of Branch Kangra, H.P.
9. It was assured by respondent No. 2 that the above-mentioned cheques would be honoured upon presentation. The receipt of these two cheques was confirmed by the officials of the petitioner-Company, namely, Mr. S. Kumar, in the email sent to the accused on 06.04.2017. However on 26.05.2017, the petitioner-Company through its Legal Manager issued a legal notice to the accused asking him to fulfill his legal obligations. The cheque of Rs. 80,00,000/- was presented for realisation by the petitioner-Company to its banker HDFC Bank Ltd., Kailash Building, Kasturba Gandhi Marge, New Delhi, however, the cheque was returned to the petitioner-Company with endorsement 'Stop Payment'. Thereafter petitioner-Company filed a criminal complaint in this regard and the same is pending adjudication in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House Court, New Delhi.
10. Respondent No. 2 on gaining the knowledge that now the matter regarding dishonour of cheque is going to be filed in the court, weaved out a story that, since the dispute between the parties regarding the sale and purchase of vehicles was on-going, and the officials of the petitioner-Company approached respondent No. 2 on 22nd/23rd November, 2016 and requested that cheques are necessary for finalisation of the agreement, it is then that respondent No. 2 issued the aforesaid cheques and handed over the same to the officials of the petitioner-Company. Thereafter respondent No. 2 lodged a complaint with the police station against the petitioner-Company on the allegations of forgery and cheating and such complaint eventually culminated into the aforesaid FIR. However, earlier to that, the officials of the petitioner-Company, namely, Mr. S. Kumar and Mr. Vishal Kumar had received a notice from the Sub-Inspector, Karan Singh in the month of June, 2017 and in compliance to the said notice, the Legal Manager of the petitioner-Company visited Kangra police station and asked for the copy of the complaint which was not supplied to him. Thereafter two officials applied for the anticipatory bail and got interim bail for five days. On 11.06.2017, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dharamshala disposed of the bail application on the basis of the status report, as the police had not lodged the FIR till the said date. However, thereafter Sub Inspector Karan Singh surprisingly appeared in the head office of petitioner-Company on 27.07.2017 alongwith 7-8 police officials to arrest the two officials of the petitioner-Company and it is then they came to know about the registration of the aforesaid FIR.
11. The petitioners have sought for quashing of the FIR on various grounds like; the offence being purely of a civil nature, the police at Kangra had no territorial jurisdiction to register the FIR and that the contents of the FIR are false and fabricated apart from being vexatious and, therefore, the FIR should be quashed.
12. Reply to the petition has been filed by respondent No. 1 on the affidavit of Superintendent of Police, Kangra at Dharamshala, wherein it was averred that as per the investigation conducted by the police, the cheques, in question, were issued by respondent No. 2 in favour of the petitioner-Company in Kangra district. It was further averred that when the Investigating Officer went to Delhi for investigation of the case, the employees of the petitioner-Company did not cooperate with the police. Mr. S. Kumar, General Manager and Mr. Vishal, Senior Manager, who are the managing officials of the petitioner-Company and did not meet the police officials deliberately, rather fed away from the office. The employees of the petitioner-Company, namely, Rupali, Bhawna and Khusbu did not let the police to go inside the office of the petitioner-Company and had locked the gate from inside and in this manner they helped the accused persons in fleeing away. After about 15 minutes, a person named Nishant Yadav, who introduced himself as Legal Officer of the petitioner-Company, opened the gate and took the police party inside the office but by that time Mr. S. Kumar and Mr. Vishal Kumar managed to escape from the office. In this regard, after returning from Delhi, the police party had recorded rapat No. 46, dated 28.07.2018, annexed with the reply as Annexure R-1.
13. It was also averred that as per the investigation, it was the petitioner-Company who has cheated respondent No. 2 by trying to encash the cheque which was given as security for performance of agreement, for purchase of vehicles despite knowing well that they had failed to deliver the vehicles in time and the said deal had already been cancelled by respondent No. 2. In addition, It was further averred that as per the record, prior to this all the payments to the petitioner-Company at the instance of respondent No. 2 were being made by RTGS mode in terms of the agreement.
14. As regards respondent No. 2, he has filed separate reply, wherein preliminary objections regarding maintainability of the petition on various ground as set out therein have been raised. On merits, the entire allegations levelled by the petitioner(s) have been denied and it has been stated that it was the employees of the petitioner-Company who told respondent No. 2 that their seniors would consider him as a better business prospect if he were to show his seriousness and credibility by giving them post-dated cheques and it was thereafter respondent No. 2 issued two aforesaid post dated cheques, to show his earnestness in entering into business with the petitioner-Company. In the month of November between 22-25th November, 2016, these cheques were entrusted to the representatives of the petitioner-Company and handed over at kangra. However, the said deal was not completed and the petitioner-Company did not return these cheques on one pretext or the other. It was thereafter on 15.02.2017 respondent entered into an agreement with the petitioner-Company for purchase of 143 used cars. As per the terms and conditions of the agreement, respondent No. 2 was required to make all the payments through RTGS and it was for this reason that he in compliance to the agreement had made all payments through RTGS. Therefore, there was no question of issuing the cheques towards the payment as sales consideration or towards the payments of the cars. The respondent No. 2 had already in reply to the legal notice issued by the petitioner-Company dated 25.06.2017 stated that it was the petitioner who had failed to deliver the cars as per the Contract and it was also possible that the petitioner-Company, in fact, did not have these cars for delivery. It was further stated that because of the non-delivery of cars the respondent No. 2 had suffered huge loss and reputation and requested the petitioner-Company to return Rs. 30,00,000/- that has been given as security deposit as per the agreement.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of investigation as well as the material placed on record.
The main plank of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner(s) for quashing of the FIR is that the same is the counter blast to the proceedings initiated by the petitioner-Company whereby it has instituted a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act against respondent No. 2, which is pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House Court, New Delhi.
15. The powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 of the Code even though are very wide but it is because of the very plenitude of the power that requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power cannot and should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy; more so, when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of such magnitude that they cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Undoubtedly, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage.
16. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Others v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Others MANU/SC/0261/1988 : (1988) 1 SCC 692, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-
"7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage."
17. In State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajan Lal & Others MANU/SC/0115/1992 : 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in its earlier decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. gives certain categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court made it clear that it was not possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised:
"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
18. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, MANU/SC/0946/2003 : (2004) 1 SCC 691, Hon'ble Supreme Court culled out the following principles for exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code:-
"(i) To give effect to an order under the Code.
(2) To prevent abuse of the process of court.
(3) To otherwise secure the ends of justice.
(4) Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision.
(5) Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself.
(6) It would be an abuse of process of court to allow any action which would result in injustice.
(7) In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court.
(8) When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact.
(9) When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an inquiry, whether the evidence in question is reliable or not, or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it acquisition would not be sustained-That is the function of the trial Judge.
(10) Section 482 is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.
(11) It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed.
(12) If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same.
(13) When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance-It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person-The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot be itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings."
19. In C.P. Subhash v. Inspector of Police Chennai and others MANU/SC/0094/2013 : (2013) 11 SCC 599, it was once again reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that where complaint prima facie makes out commission of offence, High Court in ordinary course should not invoke its powers to quash such proceedings, except in rare and compelling circumstances and it was observed as under:-
"[7] The legal position regarding the exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the High Court, in relation to pending criminal proceedings including FIRs under investigation, is fairly well settled by a long line of decisions of this Court. Suffice it to say that in cases where the complaint lodged by the complainant whether before a Court or before the jurisdictional police station makes out the commission of an offence, the High Court would not in the ordinary course invoke its powers to quash such proceedings except in rare and compelling circumstances enumerated in the decision of this Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others, MANU/SC/0115/1992 : 1992 Supp 1 SCC 335.
8. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Rajesh Bajaj v. State, NCT of Delhi, MANU/SC/0155/1999 : 1999 3 SCC 259 where this Court observed:
"...If factual foundation for the offence has been laid down in the complaint the Court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. For quashing an FIR (a step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence."
9. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, MANU/SC/0946/2003 : 2004 1 SCC 691 where this Court said:
"11...The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code "
10. Decisions of this Court in V.Y. Jose and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr., MANU/SC/8460/2008 : 2009 3 SCC 78 and Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley etc., MANU/SC/0100/2011 : 2011 3 SCC 351 reiterate the above legal position."
20. Thus, what can be considered to be settled on the basis of the exposition of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, High Court has to be both cautious as well as circumspect. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint/FIR/charge-sheet etc. discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein?
21. Judged in light of the aforesaid exposition of law, it needs to be noticed that the investigation in this case, is at the very initial and nascent stage, as the same has been stayed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, therefore, in the given circumstances, it would not be proper for us to give a detailed reasoning as it may cause prejudice to either of the parties.
22. In our considered opinion, it is only when on reading the FIR, a sheer absurdity in allegations is noticed and when no prima facie cognizable case is made out on its mere reading due to absurdity in allegations or when facts disclose prima facie cognizable case, then the Court may, in appropriate case, consider it proper to quash the FIR. It is settled that the condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under Section 157 of the Code is that the FIR must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on. The Court then has no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences.
23. Having heard the learned both the counsel for the parties and perusing the material available on record, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner has prematurely approached this Court for quashing the FIR and it would, therefore, not be appropriate for this court to quash the FIR without proper investigation being conducted by the police. As observed earlier, this court while quashing the FIR has to be both cautious and circumspect and there is no reason for us, especially, when it is not prima facie established that continuing of investigation in such cases would only amount to abuse of the process of law. Therefore, in the given circumstances, it would not be appropriate for this Court, at this stage when the investigation is yet to be completed, to comment upon the merits of the case. However, we may prima facie set out certain reasons as to why at this stage, we restrain ourselves from interfering or quashing the FIR.
24. Admittedly, the FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence. It is information of a cognizable offence given under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The legislature in its wisdom under the provisions of the Code has given limited/restrictive power to the Court to intervene at the stage of investigation by the police. Investigation is the exclusive domain of the police.
25. A perusal of the complaint filed by the petitioner i.e. Carzonrent against respondent No. 2 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which is pending in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House Court, New Delhi, would go to show that it is the specific case set out by the petitioner, that soon after the receipt of the notice issued under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, respondent No. 2 issued cheque bearing No. 518943, amounting to Rs. 80,00,000/-, dated 05.05.2017, drawn on Punjab National Bank, Kangra, towards part of the contractual obligation as agreed between the parties.
26. Similar averments have been reiterated in paragraph 11 of the legal notice, it shall be apt to reproduce the contents of the same, which read thus:-
"11. That your aforesaid conduct speaks volume about fraud and deception played by you from inception of the Agreement dated 15.02.2017 upon our client, you initially convinced our client with fraudulent intentions to enter into agreement dated 15.02.2017 and then you issued cheques dated 05.05.2017 after receipt of notice dated 25.05.2017 and issued stop payment instructions to your banker towards the cheque bearing No. 518943."
27. This Court after taking into consideration the aforesaid averments has pointedly asked the petitioner through his counsel as to how the petitioner-Company came into the possession of the cheques, more particularly, when the specific case of the petitioner as set out in the instant petition is that on 05.04.2017, respondent No. 2 had came to the office of the petitioner-Company at New Delhi and thereafter issued these cheques as is evidently clear from para-9 of the petition, which reads thus:-
"9. That on 5th April, 2017, the respondent No. 2 came to the office of the petitioner company situated at New Delhi and met with Managing Director of the petitioner company namely Mr. Rajiv Vij and Mr. S. Kumar and Mr. Vishal (officials of petitioner company) and handed over the below mentioned cheques:
A. Cheque bearing No. 518943, amounting to Rs. 80,00,000/-, dated 05.05.2017 of Branch Kangra, H.P.
B. Cheque bearing No. 518941, amounting to Rs. 3,00,00,000/-, dated 03.04.2017 of Branch Kangra, H.P. to the above named officials of the petitioner company and assured them that the cheque is part payment for delivery of the remaining vehicle as per the contract. It was assured by the respondent No. 2 that above mentioned cheques will be honoured upon presentation to fulfill the legal obligation and legally enforceable liability of the respondent No. 2 as per the contract. It was also stated by the respondent No. 2 that he will complete the obligation of the contract within reasonable period of time. That the official of the petitioner company namely Mr. S. Kumar also wrote a confirming mail to the accused on 6th April, 2017 mentioning the fact of the cheques as mentioned above. The communication took place through emails and the copy of cheques are thereof is enclosed herewith as Annexures P-3 & 4."
28. The petitioner was at a complete loss to answer this query, once the petitioner himself has given conflicting version as to how it came in possession of the cheque(s) in question, obviously the FIR cannot be quashed as the vital aspect of the case are required to be investigated by the police and, therefore, it cannot prima facie be held that the FIR is a counter blast to the proceedings initiated by the petitioner against respondent No. 2 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
29. In addition to the above, it would be noticed that majority of the allegations, save and except the agreement in question, as set out by the petitioner, have been denied by the respondents and such denial is not just an evasive denial but is backed by certain explanation as also supporting material, which at this stage, we would be hesitant to refer, lest it causes prejudice to the parties.
30. The allegations regarding respondent No. 2 having visited Delhi and handed over the cheques on 05.04.2017, which have been denied by respondent No. 2 are otherwise contrary to the case set up by the petitioner in the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and is, therefore, a matter that is required to be thoroughly investigated.
31. Further, this Court can quash the FIR only if it comes to a conclusion that the continuing investigation in the case would amount to abuse of the process of Court. However, as noticed above, this is not the factual situation obtaining in this case and, therefore, this Court cannot abridge the investigation, which is indeed required to ascertain factual assertion made in the FIR.
32. Accordingly, we find no merit in these petitions and the same are consequently dismissed. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
Interim order stands is vacated.
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